jeudi 22 avril 2021

On the Syrian regime, its structure and networks in 2021

Professor at the American University of Paris, author of Dans la tête de Bachar al-Assad (with Subhi Hadidi and Farouk Mardam Bey, Actes Sud, 2018) and Syria: La révolution orpheline (Actes Sud, 2014), Ziad Majed evokes the situation in Syria and within the regime circles and networks.

An interview published (originally in French) in Moyen-Orient, April 2021.

Between 2011 and 2021, the regime of Bashar Al-Assad (in power since 2000) went from threatened and moribund to strengthened and durable. How did he manage to adapt in a time of war?

There are several factors that have allowed Bashar Al-Assad to maintain himself in Damascus and to survive the revolution and then the war, which he himself initiated against a large part of the Syrian society.

The first is violence, which has been his only policy since the first day of the popular uprising and long before its militarization. It became unprecedentedly intense from the summer of 2012 onwards when he started his aerial bombing campaigns, the systematic destruction of hospitals, schools and infrastructure in the areas that escaped his control, the sieges he imposed on several localities, and the torture on an industrial scale in his jails. He has thus reproduced a scenario similar to the one reserved for the city of Hamah in February 1982 (which, under his father Hafez, had suffered a siege, destruction and massacres killing and injuring tens of thousands of civilians under the pretext of facing a rebellion of the Muslim brothers). Except that this time the scenario was extended to the national scale.

samedi 17 avril 2021

The agony of the Great Lebanon

Cyclical political crises that paralyze state institutions and regularly postpone all electoral deadlines and government formation, insecurity and powerlessness in the face of interference from regional and international actors, widespread clientelism at all levels of the administration, a public debt estimated at more than 150% of GDP, banks (where 1% of depositors hold 50% of the deposits) are in dire straits, hyperinflation and falling purchasing power, half of the population is impoverished and Palestinian and Syrian refugees are living in misery. One hundred years after its birth, "Greater Lebanon" is sinking into the abyss and no longer has the means to recover.

If the political-confessional cleavages, the mediocrity and corruption of the ruling political class as well as the dilemma of Hezbollah's weapons and its organic alliance with Iran are largely responsible for the current situation, it is nevertheless clear that the Lebanese system itself, based on "consociationalism", is dying.