On Sunday May 15, 2022, Lebanon witnessed the first election - in this case legislative - since the popular uprising of 2019, the economic collapse and the devastating explosion of the port of Beirut, followed by the departure of tens of thousands of young graduates from the country. Four million Lebanese were called to the polls to elect a new Parliament.
The results of this election offer several lessons on the new political power relations and the extent of the crisis that the state and society are going through.
The reasons for the descent into
hell
To better understand the context in which these elections took place, we must first recall that Lebanon has been experiencing for two years: a financial downfall depriving a large part of the Lebanese of their bank savings; a loss of value of the national currency[1]; record poverty and unemployment rates[2], shortages of electricity, water, gasoline, flour and medicine; political and sectarian tensions; and pressure on the judiciary to obstruct its investigation into the deadly Beirut Port explosion that devastated entire neighborhoods in the capital on August 4, 2020, killing hundreds and injuring thousands.
There are four major reasons for this sinking into the abyss. The first concerns the elites that have governed since the end of the war in 1990, most of whom are the product of that war and its unpunished crimes, of the Syrian and Israeli invasions that followed its outbreak, of the emergence of the Iranian-funded Hezbollah, and of the mafia-like hegemony of Damascus until 2005. Through the distribution of state resources and through clientelist networks fed by reconstruction money, these same elites, rival but united when their privileges are threatened, have managed to impose their choices for 32 years.
The second reason is the complicity between bankers and political leaders. This has led to the distribution of contracts and bank credits among a minority of businessmen, and to the over-indebtedness of the state, allowed and covered by the financial engineering of the Central Bank, until the total collapse. All of this against a backdrop of dizzying corruption, and the smuggling of dollars and subsidized products to Syria, especially over the past four years.
The third reason lies in the relationship between the Lebanese political elites and external actors. The latter have always interacted with great influence in internal affairs. Since independence, a national consensus has been difficult to find regarding the country's position in relation to the regional axes. At the same time, sectarian divisions have encouraged foreign forces to hunt for allies, with the aim of creating arenas for confrontation by proxy. The latest episodes to date: the confrontation since 2003 between the Iranians and the Saudis, or between the Iranians and the Americans, not to mention the threats between the Israelis and the Iranians, which evoke settling of scores on Lebanese soil.
Finally, the fourth factor is the excessive power of Hezbollah. It is the only party that is still heavily armed in the country. This excess power has had several effects: it has allowed the Shiite party to impose its alliances in foreign policy, to use violence against its opponents, to send (since 2012) thousands of fighters to fight in Syria under Iranian orders, and to threaten any citizen's impulse or legal proceedings that question its actions and its untouchable status. The repercussions have been severe on Lebanon's stability, as well as on its relations with several Arab and international actors essential for the survival of its economy.
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The conduct of the elections and the meaning of the results
It was in a country crushed by crisis that voters chose their deputies. Fatigue, despair, anger, daily humiliations, and some calls for a boycott undoubtedly affected the turnout. Only 49% of Lebanese went to the polls. On the diaspora side, the rate was, on the other hand, high: 60% participation, compared to 55% in 2018 (when the principle of voting abroad was implemented for the first time). Even if this electorate forms only 3.7% of the national electorate, its behavior is important to note, since it was both mobilized, often against the lists of the parties in power, and especially because it is young and educated. This is particularly the case in the Gulf countries, but also in France and Great Britain, where tens of thousands of Lebanese have settled in the last two years after the explosion of the port of Beirut.
The results of the elections reflected the deep political divisions, allowing the major confessional groups to preserve their positions, and in some cases even to progress. Nevertheless, the results also showed the breakthrough of independent candidates or those from the October 17, 2019 protest, expressing the beginning of a change in the mentality of a part of the voters.[3]
Thus, in a Parliament of 128 deputies, elected on the basis of confessional representation in 15 constituencies (64 Christians and 64 Muslims)[4], the Shiite Hezbollah and its allies (the Shiite movement Amal and the Christian "patriotic current" of the president of the republic and other Christian and Sunni formations) came out on top with 58 deputies. They have, however, lost the majority (more than 65 MPs) they held in the outgoing parliament. Their Christian, Druze and Sunni opponents won 42 MPs. Christian and sunni independents (notables, descendants of political families, and individuals close to politicians who decided not to run) won 15 seats, and finally, candidates representing groups that actively participated in the 2019 popular uprising snatched 13 sunni, Christian and Druze seats (4 of which are held by women)[5]. Their breakthrough is one of the most striking phenomena of these elections.
The analysis of the vote shows several important elements.
First, the large Shiite turnout in
previous elections (57% on average) has declined (and did not exceed 50% this
time). This did not prevent Hezbollah and its ally Amal from monopolizing
Shiite representation, but it did illustrate a decrease in their mobilization
capacity, allowing for the first time since 1992 two candidates (Druze and
Greek Orthodox) to win against two members of their mixed list in their
southern Lebanese fiefdom.
Second, former Sunni Prime Minister Saad Hariri's call for a boycott of the elections was only partially followed in his community[6]. This made possible the victory of several independents and especially of at least four candidates from the protest movement. Hariri is likely to be politically isolated in the coming months, although he is counting on the possible failures of the future government to come back and rebuild his legitimacy.
Third, the elections confirmed the weakening of President Michel Aoun's current (led by his son-in-law Gebran Bassil) on the Christian side. Considered one of the main culprits of the current catastrophe in the country, and a faithful ally of Hezbollah, it owes to the latter the election of at least 5 of its 18 deputies (elected thanks to the votes of Hezbollah Shiites in mixed constituencies). Opposite this current, its main Christian rivals, the Lebanese forces followed by the Kataeb party and the independents, obtained the majority of the seats allocated to Christians (more than 33 seats). This is very important a few months before the presidential elections that will see a new Maronite leading the Lebanese state.
Fourth, the majority of candidates considered to be strong supporters of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad lost. This is the case in Tripoli, a predominantly Sunni city, but also in West Beqaa, a very mixed constituency, in southern Mount Lebanon, which is predominantly Druze and Christian (and the stronghold of Walid Jumblat, a Druze leader and a historical political figure), and in a constituency in southern Lebanon, which is mixed but predominantly Shiite. In all, five pro-Assad personalities (including the former vice-president of parliament, the son of a former prime minister and a prominent druze who has sat in the assembly since 1992) were defeated by five candidates from the opposition.
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Finally, it is clear that Lebanon today has a parliament without a stable political majority. In fact, it will experience what we can call a "moving majority" by theme or issue. This phenomenon puts an end to the old forms of cleavages that have marked political life since 2005, namely pro or anti-Syrian regime, or pro or anti-Hezbollah. Today, for example, there is a majority to demand the disarmament of the Shiite party, but this majority dissolves as soon as political and societal reforms are mentioned[7]. It is formed differently when it comes to financial rescue measures and negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank on the restructuring of the banking system and the "sharing of its losses". It is taking shape according to the rhythms of negotiations and compromises between the major blocs on the eve of the election of the new president of the Republic (scheduled for November 2022).
The Lebanese political landscape shaped by the legislative elections appears very fragmented, reflecting a society tormented by hardship. The challenges are enormous, and despite the breakthrough of a dozen progressive and reformist candidates, the forces responsible for the collapse of the economy, the decline of the state, the explosion of the port of Beirut and the corruption scandals have remained in place. They will probably form the next government and elect the president who will preserve their interests and impunity.
The road to change is still long.
Ziad Majed
A paper originally published in French in AOC, Paris
[1]
In 2019, one American
dollar was worth 1500 Lebanese pounds. Today the dollar is worth more than
25,000 pounds.
[2]
According to United
Nations estimates, 80% of Lebanese live below the poverty line, and the
unemployment rate is 30%.
[3]
The voting age in
Lebanon is 21. For many observers, the breakthrough of independent candidates
would have been more important if the voting age was 18.
[4]
Distributed according
to the following formula: 34 Maronites, 14 Greek Orthodox, 8 Catholics, 6 Armenians,
2 "minorities" for Christians, and 27 Sunnis, 27 Shiites, 8 Druze and
2 Alawites for Muslims.
[5]
Namely, only 8 of the
128 members of parliament are women. Political life in Lebanon has always been
dominated by a patriarchal culture and conservatism that cuts across all
religious communities.
[6]
His movement is in
great political and financial difficulty since his break with the new rulers of
Saudi Arabia, including Crown Prince Mohamad Ben Salman, who had
"sequestered" and humiliated him in 2017 (and he was
"released" following mediation by French President Emmanuel Macron).
[7]
For if the Lebanese
forces, the Kataeb party, a part of the Christian independents, the Druze bloc,
a large part of the Sunni elected representatives and many representatives of
the protest are opposed to the armed Shiite party, they do not form a
homogeneous front, and have very divergent agendas on economic issues, on the
reform of the electoral law, on women's rights and private freedoms. In the
pro-Hezbollah camp, agreements on strategic issues (the party's weapons and
foreign policy) do not necessarily cover other, mostly internal, matters.
Differences may arise on administrative decentralization, for example,
negotiations with the IMF, or civil marriage.
