Since the signing in Washington on 26 June of the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel, under the auspices of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio—who is competing with Vice President J. D. Vance, in charge of the negotiating track with Iran—a debate has emerged over Article 13 of the agreement. Under this provision, Lebanon and Israel commit themselves to refraining from “hostile or harmful actions in international political or legal forums.”
Such a commitment would effectively mean refraining from taking legal action against Israel despite the crimes it has repeatedly committed on Lebanese territory, particularly since 2023. These include the killing of thousands of Lebanese civilians, among them hundreds of children, as well as dozens of paramedics, journalists, municipal employees and humanitarian workers; the destruction of tens of thousands of homes in towns and villages in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa, as well as in Beirut’s southern suburbs; the contamination of soil and water; and the continued occupation of six hundred square kilometres of Lebanese territory, where Israeli forces continue to demolish homes and civilian infrastructure.
Despite the unconvincing official
explanations issued after several days of silence following the acceptance of
this clause, much can still be done to prevent it from imposing legal silence
in Lebanon in the face of Israel’s continuing violations of international law
and international humanitarian law.
Washington and Tel Aviv, which insisted on including this clause, are well aware of its significance at a time when Israel’s long-standing impunity is, for the first time in its history, coming under serious legal pressure. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza; South Africa has brought a case against Israel before the International Court of Justice alleging genocide; lawsuits have also been filed against Israeli officers before European courts, while further legal proceedings are being prepared in several countries.
Joining the International Criminal Court
One of the measures that can be taken in Lebanon to challenge this clause would be to organize a broad civic campaign, involving media, human-rights groups and professional associations, calling for Lebanon to join the International Criminal Court. Members of parliament could be encouraged to adopt the initiative and turn it into draft legislation, compelling a public parliamentary debate that would reveal which MPs genuinely oppose such accession and which political forces are resisting attempts to protect the country from crimes committed by the Israeli occupation.
In this context, Lebanon could draw on the expertise of international legal specialists and organizations, as well as on the experience of countries that have joined the Court, including Palestine. Despite Israeli and American threats, Palestine’s accession enabled the ICC Prosecutor and judges to proceed with the arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant.
Continuing to Document Violations
Another essential measure would be
to continue documenting Israeli crimes in Lebanon by creating a comprehensive
database comparable to the body of evidence assembled by South Africa for its
case against Israel, or to the material now available through the online
“Genocide Archive,” which contains tens of thousands of videos and photographs
of Israeli crimes in Gaza, verified through forensic examination of their
digital signatures, dates and locations.
Such documentation should also
include material published by the Israeli army itself, as well as by soldiers
and officers who boast of demolitions and destruction carried out in towns and
villages across southern Lebanon.
It would not be difficult to identify the soldiers and officers appearing in these records, or the military units to which they belong, in order to prepare future legal files against them. Where some of those criminals hold other nationalities, Lebanese organizations and citizens could also coordinate with human-rights groups in their second countries of citizenship to pursue legal action there. This is already taking place in France in cases involving Israeli-French soldiers and activists who appeared in videos filmed in or around Gaza, where they obstructed the entry of humanitarian aid into the territory, or participated in its looting or destruction.
Filing Complaints in Countries That Apply Universal Jurisdiction
Another possible avenue would be to
pursue a series of cases in countries whose legal systems allow war crimes and
crimes against humanity to be prosecuted under the principle of universal
jurisdiction. Most such countries are in Europe. This can enable Lebanese
victims who also hold the nationality of those states to bring cases against
Israel or its armed forces over the killing of relatives or the destruction of
property belonging to the plaintiffs.
The Lebanese-French artist Ali Cherri has already opened such a path. His mother and father were killed by Israel in his home in Beirut in November 2024, and, with the assistance of the International Federation for Human Rights, he filed a complaint in France. A similar step was taken only days ago by the Lebanese-French citizen Mohammad H., whose mother, sister and two children from his family were killed by Israel, while his father was seriously wounded, in their home in the city of Tyre in April 2026.
International organizations and lawyers in several European countries are ready to assist with such proceedings. Despite their complexity—and despite Israel’s refusal to cooperate with them or allow investigations—they remain politically significant. They contribute to weakening the impunity Tel Aviv seeks to preserve and to creating cracks in the protective walls Israel has built, with American support, around its violations in occupied Palestine, Lebanon and Syria (as well as in Yemen, Qatar and Iran).
There is also no doubt that greater
media coverage of existing and potential legal initiatives is essential in
order to keep the issue at the center of public debate and political scrutiny,
particularly as Lebanese-Israeli negotiations develop on the basis laid out in
the framework agreement. It is worth recalling that this agreement is neither
the end of the process nor a formal treaty.
Any “final” agreement will only take shape after further negotiations, rounds of talks and meetings that are expected to be lengthy, and whose course will also be affected by the negotiations between Tehran and Washington. At that stage, any final agreement would have to be approved first by the Council of Ministers and then by Parliament, where it will still be possible to challenge any clause that infringes upon Lebanese rights.
What matters today is to raise
voices and work to challenge the impunity surrounding Israel’s crimes,
including its occupation of Lebanese territory; to refuse blackmail and the
flimsy justifications offered both domestically and abroad; and to reject any
attempt to dismiss the importance of these legal avenues. Israel’s own
insistence on avoiding such proceedings shows just how misguided and uninformed
those who belittle them truly are.
Ziad Majed
First published in Arabic in Al-Quds Al-Arabi in July 2026
