Published in Arabic in NowLebanon on Tuesday, May 23, 2012 and translated to English By Farah Shoucair
In an attempt to regain power in negotiations with the international community, the Syrian regime had threatened to ignite the whole region. This threat can only find resonance in Lebanon; the regime's only “card” at hand. None of the neighboring countries (Jordan, Iraq, Tueky) are accessible to this feeble regime to undertake a political-bloody maneuver that would divert attention away from the Syrian Revolution. The Israeli-Golan Heights front has always been locked-in. And with the withdrawal of Hamas from the Syrian sphere of influence, the Gaza Strip is not receptive anymore. To this end, Lebanon remains the Syrian regime's only available “mailbox” for three main reasons.
First, the fragility of
Lebanon's national consensual fabric poses one of the entry points that ease
instigating sectarian or political disagreements turning them into violent
clashes. This is especially easy for this "regional player",
considering its recent history in Lebanon. The Syrian regime has practically
ruled the country between 1990 and 2005 and has militarily occupied it during
the civil war (from 1976 until 1989). As such, it is most capable of awakening
the dormant beast. The pent-up tension and violence have been accumulating
since the assassination of PM Rafik Hariri, the May 7 (2008) clashes in Beirut,
and sporadic clashes every now and then. These accumulations find roots in the
collective memory of the Lebanese, who did not invest in putting an end to all ill-feelings.
Second, the contestation
over the leadership of Sunni Muslims is a factor that should not be
underestimated. There is no doubt that former PM Saad Hariri and the Future
Movement continue to dominate leadership among this sect. Now, irrespective of
the political and economic performance of the "Harirism", the reality
is that the latter's political discourse does not reflect religious or social
extremism disposition. This reality discredits the fabricated Sunni
"scarecrow" narrative propagated by the Syrian regime and its
Lebanese allies, fallaciously aggravating the growing dominance of Salafism,
Wahhabism and (Muslim) Brotherhood in the region. The existence of liberal
Sunni political representatives (in the sense that they are sectarian but
non-religious) deflate the arguments presented by both those who prefer
Hizbuallah (the religious and sectarian) and the authoritarian Assad regime, on
the pretext that the latter is waging war against Islamic fundamentalism.
As such, it comes to
the benefit of the Syrian regime and its allies, and advocates of the "endangered
minority" theory to weaken the "Harirism" at the expense of more
radical Sunni movements that are prone to resort to violent actions once
targeted.
Third, the North of
Lebanon has always served as the Syrian regime's most preferred experimental
battlefield for acts of sabotage. Theoretically, Hizbuallah has no physical
existence in the North, which neutralizes both the party and Iran from direct
confrontations. It is worth noting that the political agenda of Hizbullah and
Iran partly overlaps with that of the Syrian official agenda, on top being the Iran's
nuclear programme, followed by securing Lebanon's influence and controlling its
Southern borders, and lastly, the future of the ruling regime in Damascus.
The above exposition
has implications for the potential conflicts in the North, which can take three
dimensions. The first dimension is a "Sunni-Alawite" conflict that
would open Tripoli's wounds and the old war between the Sunni quarter of Bab
al-Tabbaneh and the mainly Alawite Jabal Mohsend, thus mirroring the type of
sectarian polarization the Syrian regime is propagating in Syria and its
neighborhood. The second dimension is a "Sunni-minority" conflict, through
the regime's "secular" allies, whose constituency is partly based on minorities.
. Reference here is made to the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party that has a
diverse religious constituency base in Akkar, and which was commemorating the
memory of victims in the Halba crime at the time Sheikh Abdel Wahad and his
companion were killed. Finally, the third dimension is that of a
"Sunni-Sunni" conflict, which would not only push the "Harirism"
into a contestation with other Islamist movements present in the North, but
would also drive PM Najib Mikati into the competitive spiral.
Clearly, in similar
cases, the social factors would render the most impoverished player more
forceful in contesting its "enemy", thus driving others to follow
suite to maintain their status-quo.
The three dimensions
exemplify the materialization of the Syrian regime's propaganda for the region,
making use of pro-regime Lebanese media outlets’ cheap policy of inciting
hatred and sectarianism and of lightly ascribing extreme Salafisim to individuals
and groups.
What preventive
measures ought to be taken to contain the escalating situation?
Preaching is of
course pointless. Those who are directly concerned should realize the gravity
of the responsibility, from ensuring a serious investigation and holding any
criminal accountable, be it a military personnel, to removing the political
cover away from any militarized person in the street. Equally important is the
deployment of Lebanese army and internal forces, granting them full support to security
undertake their strictly mission. Additionally, there are other issues that, if
addressed, would ease the tension, such as putting an end to the Islamic
inmates detained for years without legal charges or trial. Citizens should also
join forces by forming popular committees, bringing together party
representatives, parliamentarians, representatives of municipal councils, and
civil society activist to enhance efforts to contain such tragic incidents and
its spillovers. The biggest part of the responsibility lies on the shoulders of
opponents to the Syrian regimes who are concerned with maintaining stability
and peace in the country. Opponents of the Syrian regime and supporters of the
Syrian revolution should be wary of falling into the "Salafist
attack" trap sneakily woven by the Syrian regime. This calls upon all to
double the efforts and to assume the responsibility of transparently informing
the public of their policies and actions.
The aforementioned short-term
measures are not guaranteed to succeed. Yet they deserve to be genuinely
initiated by all those who are concerned with their country's stability and who
condemn violent conflicts. On the long-term, the only solution to structurally
address the Lebanese dilemma is to delve into re-building state institutions,
identifying its mission and governance, and philosophical foundations. In that
regard, the electoral and nationality laws, decentralization, the independence
of the judiciary and the exclusive monopolization of armament are important
cornerstones.
Anything less than what is proposed here would render the country
prone to internal fragilities and manipulative external forces. This is even
more pressing given the current severe divisions between societal and political
segments, erosion of the rule law, and the existence of a "local"
military apparatus stronger than that of the state.