Today, more than six months since the inception of the Syrian
revolution, we can extract a number of conclusions from its daily events and
from the ways that the regime has dealt with it, in order to determine the
extent of its exceptionality in the Arab Spring, by Ziad Majed
- This revolution is more extended horizontally, or dispersed
geographically, in comparison with most of the other Arab revolutions. Indeed,
there is an average of 50 demonstrations (of disparate size) per day, distributed
across the Syrian cities and rural areas; whereas, in the other Arab countries,
concurrent demonstrations have not on average exceeded 15 per day.
- Likewise, the Syrian revolution is more persistent, despite
brutal and sadistic repression by the security apparatus and associated
militias (known as the Shabeeha). The exorbitant number of killed, wounded,
kidnapped, arrested, and displaced has only been exceeded by the number in
Libya—the key distinction being that Libya has endured an internecine war,
while Syria has but one uncontrollable killing machine.
- The revolution has been better able, so far, to remain non-violent
and avoid sliding into armed conflict and wide-scale acts of revenge, despite
the horrible atrocities inflicted upon the participants and their families, and
despite repeated attempts by the regime to drag the people into a cycle of
revenge that would exacerbate sectarian impulses, as well as unnerve and
frighten those who are hesitant about getting involved. The end result would be
to open the field to the security apparatus to increase its criminally
indiscriminate repression of the protestors.
- It is also more dependent on itself for coverage of its
activities and events as a result of the regime banning the presence of
independent media in the country. It is more productive and innovative in its
slogans and cheers, and more expressive of domestic solidarity through its
coordination committees and unions, which confront the objectives of the regime
across cities, villages, and regions. Furthermore, the accompanying cultural
and artistic movement, the writings about it, the spirit of satire bursting out
of its slogans have become, after more than 180 days, a treasure—one that could
possibly become the basic record, a foundational memoir of the revolution.
- It is incredibly rich symbolically, in terms of smashing the
idols of the past completely, in part because it challenges the only Arab (republican)
regime which was successfully passed down from father to son—and a regime second
only to Libya in terms of how authority became centralized by a familial clan. Moreover,
it is the richest in its icons, since there are incredible numbers of children,
women, and adolescents who have been barbarically killed and thus transformed
into inspirational figures for the movement to continue.
- Last but not least, it is the revolution with the most women in
positions of leadership or representation, in comparison with the other
revolutions.
Conversely, it is possible
to say that the past months have made apparent:
- That the Syrian regime possesses no way of behaving except
through repressive security measures, and in its disposition and structure has
no political flexibility to give whatsoever. The driving force behind it has
adopted from the first day a policy of killing, terrorization, cutting
connections between cities, and preventing access to their public spaces (with
drastic measures in the capital Damascus and in the city of Aleppo), in order
to isolate the protests in the countryside and smaller cities, and subsequently
facilitate dealing with them with an iron fist.
- That the proportion of the frightened and intimidated individuals
who have hesitated to get involved with the revolution or support it remains
high in many areas, for different reasons, from economic to the psychological
and the social-sectarian. There is also an element of submissiveness in
requesting stability and commercial/services activity, in exchange for
abandoning demands for freedom and dignity, which the regime has said “would
lead to civil war”.
- That the assassination of politics over a period of 41 years has
effects which are difficult to cure in mere months. It has weakened the ability
to elaborate alternatives to the regime that possess a form of popular
legitimacy, a political plan, and a democratic form of organization in the time
allotted.
- That the response has been slow in addressing the necessity of
coordinating the work between the old opposition, the new generation of the
uprising, the personalities possessing moral standing or a cultural, political,
or media presence —both domestically and abroad. This sluggishness has several
reasons, which can be considered, but the key implication is that it benefits
the regime and shows that the national collective leadership has not crystallized
in conjunction with the pace of the protests and the bleeding of its people.
However, these things are subject to change and adaptation in line
with the evolution of the Syrian movement in the coming weeks. Despite all the
arrests, liquidations, and threats, popular pressure on the regime has not
abated. It rather continues ceaselessly (and surprisingly) in its perseverance
and insistence on the principle of “isqat
al-nizham (the regime must fall).” It is likely that most of those who
hesitate will change their attitudes when they feel their interests threatened
or the balance tilt in favor of the revolution, or until they tire of
persisting in a state of endless waiting. Additionally, the confused regional
and international stances toward the Syrian situation will tend more and more
toward increasing resoluteness in the form of additional sanctions against the
regime, as its killing machine continues to reap the lives of its citizens.
What is most important, at the end, is that the Syrian regime will fall
and join its Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan predecessors. Human and economic costs
of its collapse, however, depend on how fast this collapse would be.
What is most important, also, is that fear no longer has an impact
in the ranks of the revolution. Syrians continue to teach us every day to live
with a quantity and intensity of emotions and feelings that can rarely converge
in “normal” days. This will redefine human relationships inside Syria and around
it, and will also take part in drawing the features of its future.
This text was originally published in Arabic in Now Lebanon. Many thanks to Jeff Regger who translated it to English.
