Recent events in Egypt, in the successive chapters since 30 June, carry
myriad political and social implications as well as problematic questions
related to the issue of democracy, the role of the military, the status of the
Muslim Brotherhood and its brief experience in power in the largest Arab and
Mediterranean country.
The following text presents five observations on what has occurred and
the circumstances and paradoxes that both accompanied and continue to accompany
ongoing events.
The second observation is connected to the end of a long ascendant
assessment that the ability to mobilize the Egyptian street (and the Arab
street generally) is limited to Islamists, and that there is no popular
presence of other political orientations. The millions that took to the streets
against the Brotherhood illustrate the hastiness of this assessment, although a
distinction must be made between organized political forces, where the
Islamists hold a significant superiority, and the wider public who are not
members in political party formations. The general mood appears to reject all
political excess, including excessive religionization of politics or
politicization of religion.
The third observation is related to what can be considered the harsh
political, media, and social assessment of the Brotherhood’s experience in
ruling Egypt, as the Brotherhood was only in power for a bit more than one
year, during which they faced serious crises, most of which existed for decades
or at least took root years before their election. They likewise faced
heightened expectations and major hopes for positive change, typical in the
stages directly following revolutions, most of which face setbacks as a result
of political and economic faltering. Of course, one can say that the
Brotherhood’s behavior which appeared monopolistic and egotistical, and their
weak performance and simplistic approaches to problems and challenges made it
difficult for broad sectors of public opinion to accept the slowness of change
and lack of follow up on crises, which of course fueled and broadened the
opposition camp or those hostile to the Brotherhood.
However, another issue can be added to this question of the assessment
by some segments of Egyptians, which is the class dimensions related to the
rural origins of the majority of Muslim Brothers, who are viewed by some urban
groups with a suspicion that borders on contempt. Perhaps the essential
elements of the derision faced by Mursi were connected with his personal
behavior, linguistic weakness, and social “stereotyping” affecting him and his
wife, as well as the Brotherhood elite more generally, who went from prisons
and pulpits in villages and lower-class neighborhoods to the clubs of authority
that had previously been perceived as “modernized” (and sometimes bourgeois),
for decades. All of this provided rich material for a number of entertainment
programs and satirical websites, often going beyond politics or just an
assessment of Mursi’s performance, creating a general atmosphere where the
president became seen as an insult to the presidency itself.
The fourth observation is at
the heart of the debate over what is called “the Islamic failure in power.” Writings in this tendency have proliferated, taking
the fierce popular uprising against Mursi and the Brotherhood as proof that the
project of political Islam has hit a dead end. But it is useful in this context
to pause to consider two issues:
The first is whether there is actually such a project of political
Islam. The second is the length of time needed to allow judgment of this
project, if there is one.
On the first issue, talking about a political project does not appear
to be supported by clear data or by programs and economic visions offered. This
is because the Brothers - and they are who is meant here - did not present an
economic project, and neither they nor any others have financial and tax
programs that differ from the reigning “consensus”. Likewise, they have not
adopted a governing philosophy different from constitutionalism (presidential
or parliamentary), and they have not formulated a foreign policy or
substantially changed the relationship to donor countries and institutions from
existing policy. Most of what differentiates them and other Islamists are
issues of social legislation that mainly focuses on controlling their central
obsession: women, which in any case, is a discussion deserving extensive
attention beyond the scope of this current article. So it does not seem that
there is an actual Islamist project that was implemented (or present) to be
judged. Even if what is intended is the claims by Islamists of holding their
own solutions and alternative to what has prevailed in the previous eras since
national independences, and even if they say that in the examples of the
ancestors (Salaf) they can find a value system and culture of governance, it is
not possible to consider their presence in power for one year as a sufficient
basis to launch judgements of success or failure. This is even if the
indications tend toward the likelihood of their failure in administering Egypt,
on both objective and subjective bases. The situation and the circumstances are
complex, and their well-practiced nature as opposition forces did not give them
the expertise to rule or qualify them for good political and economic
governance.
The fifth observation is directly connected to the issue of democracy
and the coup that was executed by the military whose impact was to “sequester”
the elected president and arrest him. There is no evading this characterization
and the adoption of the appropriate terminology. The enormous demonstrations
and popular mobilization, unprecedented in previous Egyptian history, against
the rule of Mursi, do not change the fact that the actions of the military
(beginning with the Minister of Defense General al-Sisi delivering a warning to
Mursi and to all political forces to agree within 48 hours, continuing with the
deployment of fighter planes, helicopters over, and tanks in strategic areas of
the major cities, and finally storming the presidential headquarters, forcing
the president to step aside, and arresting him, then closing most of the media
loyal to him and detaining some of their workers, and placing a travel ban on
the Brotherhood leadership and “requesting” that the judiciary move against
them) constitute a military coup as described above, even under the pretext of
responding to the will of the masses, and even if these actions were acclaimed
by some crowds. However, what is more important than continuing the debate over
the characterization is the path things will take in the coming weeks and
months, and the balance of forces that will impose settlements and trade-offs,
and limit the role that will be played by the military in determining these
outcomes and the shape of the coming conflict with the Brotherhood.
In the end, it can be said that the “aesthetics” of the popular scene
on 30 June and its celebrated implications are insufficient to cover another
scene of the utmost complexity: the political scene, which is occupied by the
military in part, and in part by the Muslim Brotherhood, as if we have returned
to the extortionary binary formula that was used for so long by authoritarian
rulers to justify their permanence and to prevent change, while acknowledging
there is now a totally different set of circumstances (not only because it is
accompanied by a popular movement that is one of the most significant successes
of the Arab revolutions, but also because it comes after relatively free
parliamentary and then presidential elections, which were the first of their
kind in the history of Egypt, which were won by the Brotherhood). And we will
soon find ourselves before a narrative of “the oppressiveness of the
Brotherhood” recalling Egyptian and Arab precedents (like the Algerian and
Palestinian cases), and it is possible if the conflict intensifies and its
actors continue to demonize and dehumanize the other (and occasionally
justifying violence and oppression against them) that some of the Brotherhood
constituents will tend toward extremism, militancy, and rejection of the political
process, and thus threaten the stability of Egypt as a whole.
The Egyptian path, therefore,
is one that in the coming weeks may become even less straightforward. The two certainties are (a-) that the “street” can remain
influential and capable of mobilizing to pressure for peaceful change only if
the clash between the military and the Brotherhood is prevented, and (b-) that citizens don't forget that the control of the military over politics is no less
dangerous to democracy than the excess of any elected ruler beyond the limits
of his mandate, whether in the name of the sacred or in the name of the
profane.
Ziad Majed
Translated from
Arabic (first published in Al-Hayat) by Jeff Reger
