This is the question that many people are still asking, devastated by the economic collapse and political decadence that are engulfing Lebanon in the abyss.
The following text
is a synthetic answer to the question, built around five reasons.
The first one concerns the political elites that have governed since the end of the war in 1990. It is necessary to recall once again that they are mostly the product of that war, of its crimes that went unpunished, of its mutations and its culture of violence, of the Syrian and Israeli invasions that followed its outbreak, of the emergence of the Iranian-financed Hezbollah, and then of the Mafia-like hegemony of Damascus until 2005. Through their narratives of the wartime past, through the distribution of state resources according to their nepotist mechanisms and then through the clientelist networks fed by reconstruction money, these same elites, rival but united when their privileges are threatened, have managed to impose their choices or at least to hinder the functioning of state institutions if these choices are not accepted. The consequences have been dramatic over the years: government paralysis, parliamentary closures and a permanent inability to protect a fragile civil peace or to introduce political and economic reforms, even cosmetic ones.
The second reason is the monopolization of representation within each community. In fact, since the 1970s, one after another, religious communities have sought an identity based on loyalty and "sacred union" around a political force capable of defending it. This led to the construction of dominant institutions and discourses within communities, the creation of unique language and consciousness, the evil representation of "others" and the erasure of political diversity. This phenomenon has remained pervasive in the post-war period, and was renewed in 2005 after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, and again in 2011 with the onset of the revolution in Syria.
The third reason is the complicity between bankers, businessmen and political leaders since 1992. This has led to the distribution of juicy contracts and bank credits among a minority of businessmen affiliated with the confessional forces in power, and the over-indebtedness of the state and the financial engineering of the Central Bank covering it and allowing its continuation, until the total collapse. All this against a backdrop of dizzying corruption, mismanagement, and smuggling of dollars and subsidized products, especially during the last four years, to Syria.
The fourth reason lies in the relationship between the Lebanese political elites and external actors. The latter have always been an influential factor in internal political equations. Since independence, a national consensus in Lebanon has been difficult to reach regarding the country's position in relation to the regional axes clashing not far from its borders. At the same time, sectarian cleavages have encouraged foreign forces to hunt for allies in order to create arenas for proxy confrontations. The latest episodes: the confrontation since 2003 between the Iranians and the Saudis, or between the Iranians and the Americans, not to mention the threats between the Israelis and the Iranians, which evoke settling of scores from Lebanese soil.
Finally, the fifth reason, which has weighed most heavily since 2006, is the excessive power of Hezbollah and its militia, the only one still armed in the country. This excess power has had several effects: it has allowed the Shiite party to impose its choices in foreign policy, to use violence against its opponents, to send (since 2012) thousands of fighters to fight in Syria in support of the Assad regime, to illustrate itself as the most reliable Iranian ally in the region, and to threaten any citizen's initiative or legal proceeding that question its actions and its untouchable status. The repercussions have been severe on Lebanon's stability as well as on its relations with several Arab and international actors essential for the survival of its economy.
Thus, Lebanon has
gradually sunk into an existential crisis, and today does not seem able to
recover.
For if the urgency is the economic and financial rescue that can only come from international bodies, it would be illusory to imagine a medium and long term recovery without reforming the political institutions in order to renew the elites and change the modus operandi that produces them, and to put in place an independent judicial system, allowing to turn the page of the impunity that has reigned for decades. And this will require in parallel a solution within the national framework to Hezbollah's weapons and an agreement on the country's place and role in its region...
Ziad Majed
First published in French in L’Orient Littéraire, in December 2021
