An Interview on "The Orphan Revolution"
"When I finished the book in Arabic at the end of November 2013, Razan Zaitouneh, who through her work embodies the revolution values, along with Samira Al-Khalil (a former political prisoner and an activist from day one in the revolution) Wael Hamada (activist and husband of Mrs. Zaitouneh) and Nazem Hamady (a lawyer, activist and poet), had not yet been kidnapped. In my opinion their kidnapping is one of the most brutal and ugly acts, both for what it meant and for its location (in Douma in the heart of the “liberated” East Ghouta), as well as for the responsibility for the kidnapping by a large, militant Islamic group that controls the region. Therefore, I amended the dedication in the French version, which was issued in Paris, to read: To Razan Zaitouneh, Samira Al-Khalil and Faïek al-Meer. The latter played a very important role in the revolution, having previously spent 12 years in the Assad prisons, and was arrested on October 7, 2013".
Let’s begin with the title of the book. What do you mean by
the “orphan revolution?”
I
chose this title, which was used by Farouq Mardam Bey in one of his articles
two years ago, because, in my opinion, it accurately describes the condition of
the Syrian Revolution. It is a revolution that, from its inception, has not
enjoyed proper support or solidarity as guaranteed by its “advocates”, or at
the very least not in proportion to the amount of sacrifices and nightmares
that have pursued the Syrian people due to the violent response of the Syrian
regime and its allies, Iran and Russia.
Suffice
it to say that today, despite more than 130,000
killed, 150,000 detained, 8 million displaced, chemical attacks, missile and
air raids, and photos of the “death industry” inside Assad’s prisons, the
global response has not met its responsibility,
politically, militarily, diplomatically, in the courts, or on the
streets. This gives us a people left to face a severe, monstrous, and
well-equipped killing machine: an image of orphans.
So why this abandonment, or this global onlooker mentality?
There
are many reasons which I have tried to explain in the book. Some relate to the
reality of international relations today, others to conflicting regional
interests, a regression in "Western" interest in the Middle East, the
rise of a culturalistic school towards our region that sees violence as normal
behavior for its groups. Then there is Islamophobia, causing some to defend the
regime or be biased in its favor as a secular and progressive alternative to
Islam, despite being despotic and criminal. Finally, there are those who
believe in "conspiracy theories," and they are many. This group
interprets the world as a series of plots into which all people fall victim.
The book is dedicated to "media and legal activists in
Syria." Who are these activists, and where do they stand on the revolution
today?
These
are the thousands of youth, male and female, that were pushing for the
revolution in several regions from day one. They organized protests and
sit-ins, filmed and photographed what was happening around them on their mobile
phones. They also worked to defend detainees, document violations, record lists
of martyrs, and write in newspapers not only about the situations in Syria and
its prisons, but also about the joy found in freedom of speech and of the
press.
They
also uploaded pictures and videos to social network sites, thereby increasing
media outlets, while at the same time issuing periodic statements and reports
that allowed us to follow the course of revolution. Thus, they established a
shared Syrian memory which prohibited forgetfulness and the Assad regime from
drowning out the people who stood up to seize their freedom and defend it. Let
it be known that hundreds of these activists paid the price for this with their
lives, and hundreds more today are in prisons, in exile, and in hiding. Most of
those still able continue to work for the cause, or work in the fields of
development and aid. But of course their leading influence over the trajectory
of the revolution regressed since the summer of 2012, after the armed
resistance turned into the dominant means in facing the regime.
I
must point out that when I finished the book at the end of November 2013, Razan
Zaitouneh,
who through her work embodies the activists I mentioned earlier, along with
Samira Al-Khalil (a former political prisoner and an activist from day one in
the revolution) Wael Hamada (activist and husband of Mrs. Zaitouneh) and Nazem
Hamady (a lawyer, activist and poet), had not yet been kidnapped. In my opinion
their kidnapping is one of the most brutal and ugly acts, both for what it
meant and for its location (in Douma in the heart of the “liberated” East
Ghouta), as well as for the responsibility for the kidnapping by a large,
militant Islamic group that controls the region. Therefore, I amended the
dedication in the French version, which was issued in Paris, to read: To Razan Zaitouneh,
Samira Al-Khalil and Faïek al-Meer. The latter played a very important role in
the revolution, having previously spent 12 years in the Assad prisons, and was
arrested on October 7, 2013.
But is "revolution" an accurate description of the
current conflict in Syria? Can it be said that the revolution has been hijacked
as stated by many of the activists you just mentioned?
That
question is often repeated, and I believe that repetition comes from an idealistic
definition of a revolution, where it is considered to be a general, noble, and
peaceful rebellion against an oppressive government. But that definition flies
in the face of the history of revolutions. For you will find violence in
revolutions, as well as opportunists, changes in the leadership and in social orders,
and lots of mistakes. You will also find that in a revolution as deep-rooted as
Syria’s, the innermost parts of society are brought out, both the most
praiseworthy and the most vile. The revolution, therefore, continues, and the
entry of an armed resistance is a tragedy that was forced upon Syria by the
barbarianism of the regime and the global community’s resignation of its
duties. There is no doubt that this entry changes many matters and pushes
"war lords" to the forefront, especially with the passage of time, with
outside players able to interfere by building up influence and buying loyalties
and settling scores.
That
is all happening in Syria today, but that does not alter the essence of a struggle
against a despotic regime that enslaves its people, nor does it alter the
essence of the regime itself or its fascism that can be seen through terrifying
violence every day. But as for the talk of a stolen revolution, it has no scientific
meaning. If what is meant by this talk
is the tyrannical practices of the Islamists, then the issue is their
military presence and participation in the fighting. Most of them are from
rural Syria and the suburbs of the marginalized cities.
Of
course I am speaking about the Islamists of the revolution, and not about ISIS
or the jihadists coming in from abroad and who thus have no link to the
Syrian cause. They have fought the revolution and punished its people --
especially in Raqqa-- much more than they have fought the regime, which was
glad of their arrival from the beginning as they serve its propaganda and
weaken its enemies.
If we asked you what is the greatest thing that the Syrian
revolution has
achieved to date, what would you reply ?
The
restoration of "Syria the society" and "Syria the people."
For Syria, apart from the current situation and
its future outcomes, is no longer merely borders and geopolitical
strategy, as Hafez al-Assad wanted it to be, and as he and his son named it
"The Assads’ Syria." It no longer belongs to them, living outside the
era they once wanted for it: "Forevermore," as their hideous slogan
said. But the price has been very high, and, of course, dreadful.
Translated from the Arabic (first published in Now Lebanon) by Joseph Sills
